Vietnam's shrimp farming is caught between high raw-material costs and falling market prices. Amid this, GrowMax, the country's only domestic shrimp-feed maker, has declared it "will not raise feed prices." In an industry structure where feed accounts for more than 60% of production costs, a maker's declaration that it will endure not raising prices and share the hardship with farmers is more than a mere support measure. For Japanese importers who buy Vietnamese shrimp, it is a story that shapes next season's procurement cost and the stability of supply.
What GrowMax's "feed-price freeze" declaration covers
According to the Agriculture and Environment newspaper, the Vietnam-born feed brand GrowMax has declared it will hold its current feed prices even as input costs such as fish meal and transport keep rising. The company's General Director, Mai Van Hoang, issued a comment to the effect that "passing on cost increases directly to feed prices would hit the farming households on the front line of market-price swings hardest." It is a stance of absorbing the increase in-house and sharing the hardship with farmers.
GrowMax is a relatively new maker founded in 2020, and it flies the banner of a vertically integrated model that connects seed stock (postlarvae), feed, biological products, advanced farms and export processing. Its feature is that it bundles everything from the upstream to the downstream of farming into a single business sphere, not feed alone.
Why this declaration came now
Behind it is the shrimp market's rapid fall since the start of 2026. Reports say the shipment price of 30-count/kg whiteleg shrimp (vannamei) fell from VND 210,000–230,000/kg at the start of 2026 to about VND 120,000/kg at present. Converted at JPY 1 ≈ VND 170 (as of June 2026), VND 230,000 is about JPY 1,350 and VND 120,000 about JPY 705. It amounts to shedding nearly half its value in half a year—said to be the lowest level in several years.
Meanwhile, the cost side is moving in the opposite direction. Fish meal, the main raw material for shrimp feed, depends on imports from Chile, Peru, Oman and elsewhere, and its international price has risen. On top came marine freight and energy costs, plus supply-network disruption from geopolitical risk. According to reports, feed went through three price increases in 2026 alone. Selling prices fall and costs rise—this declaration is the maker holding off on a fourth increase amid that pincer.
The cost structure of shrimp farming that feed controls
Why freezing feed prices carries such weight becomes clear from the cost breakdown of shrimp farming. In industry materials analyzing Vietnam's shrimp production cost, feed is outstandingly large among the variable costs.
| Cost item | Share of total production cost |
|---|---|
| Feed | About 62–65% |
| Seed stock (postlarvae) | About 13% |
| Other inputs (chemicals, fuel, interest, etc.) | About 8–9% |
| Fixed costs | About 4% |
Because feed accounts for close to two-thirds of the cost, whether feed prices are frozen or raised directly pushes a farmer's break-even point up or down. In a phase where shipment prices have fallen to VND 120,000, if feed rises another notch, farmers who halt shipments at a loss will appear. Conversely, if prices are frozen, ponds that can keep running on thin margins remain. Feed prices stand at the fork of whether the supply network withers or holds.
Vietnamese shrimp is "expensive" to begin with
Vietnamese shrimp has an inherently high production cost even compared with competing growing regions. In the same industry materials, production cost per kg is about US$4.8–5.0 for Vietnam, about US$3.4–3.8 for India, and about US$2.3–2.4 for Ecuador (converted at US$1 ≈ JPY 155, about JPY 745–775, about JPY 527–589, and about JPY 357–372 respectively). Vietnam is roughly twice Ecuador and more than 30% above India.
At the root of this high-cost constitution is the structure of relying on imports for feed raw material. Vietnam's farming cost moves each time fish meal is swung by the international market. That is precisely why the significance of a domestic brand freezing prices to act as a buffer is not small, even for defending competitiveness against low-cost growing regions like Ecuador and India. Efforts to lift productivity by making shrimp farming year-round also overlap with the moves of Quang Ninh's year-round shrimp farming in the same southern Mekong Delta sphere, but the issue of who absorbs the cost burden, and how, still remains.
The local and industry reception
The reactions of local farming figures can roughly be sorted into three. First, from small-scale farmers holding ponds, a realistic welcome that "just by feed not rising, we avoid having to empty the ponds." Second, from those handling black tiger shrimp (Ca Mau black tiger and other high-value-added varieties), mention of moving to varieties and sizes that command a unit price even in a falling market. Third, within the industry there is also a cool view that "there is a limit to one company's self-burden," and many are watching how long the freeze can continue if high raw-material costs persist.
There are also voices rating the strength of the vertically integrated model that supplies consistently from seed stock. Like the effort to domesticate broodstock, the reading is that the more a maker holds the upstream, the better it can withstand the "war of attrition" that is freezing feed prices.
Implications for Japanese importers and procurement managers
For the Japanese side handling Vietnamese shrimp, there are two stages to reading this declaration.
In the short term, the shipment-price level of VND 120,000 looks like a good chance to lower procurement costs. But procurement that beats the price down cheaply in a market-crash phase is two sides of the same coin as the risk that ponds empty—supply thins—the next season. GrowMax froze prices this time precisely to prevent this "collapse of the supply network," and the buyer side too must plan orders looking not only at "locking in large volumes while cheap" but also at whether next season's stocking (seeding) will turn.
In the medium term, it is worth adding farms that partner with makers able to absorb feed costs to the criteria for selecting procurement sources. Vertically integrated farms that produce feed and seed stock in-house are less likely to halt operations even at the market's bottom. If evaluating traceability and supply stability as a set, "which feed is used, and who absorbs cost fluctuations" can become a confirmation item in supplier audits.
Ripple effects on the market—the China shift and supply to Japan
The double blow of falling market prices and high costs also affects the composition of Vietnamese shrimp's export destinations. In a phase where price competitiveness in the U.S. market is weak, the weight of nearby, low-transport-cost China-bound shipments tends to rise. The China shift in seafood advancing means supply to Japan comes to compete with China-bound for the same quota. If Japan's procurement staff want to secure Vietnamese shrimp stably, involvement that "does not let the ponds empty"—such as annual contracts and seeding support through advance payment—becomes a realistic option, not just price negotiation.
This move of a feed maker sharing hardship with farmers can be called, beyond one company's judgment to freeze prices, an expression of the idea of "protecting the whole supply network" for Vietnam's shrimp industry to counter low-cost growing regions. How the Japanese buyer side rides this idea will shape stable procurement from next season on.
Summary—the next action to take
GrowMax's feed-price-freeze declaration amid a crashing shrimp market is the maker's choice to share risk with farmers at the sore spot of feed, which holds more than 60% of cost. There are three things Japanese importers and food makers should do now. First, the current low price is a good chance to buy, but always confirm "whether it is a price at which next season's seeding will turn." Second, add vertically integrated farms and suppliers able to absorb feed costs to the selection criteria. Third, build in advance—through annual contracts and seeding support—a relationship where supply does not break even at the market's bottom. From procurement that chases price alone to procurement that protects the whole supply network—this declaration is a signal from the ground prompting that shift.
