A different air has begun to flow at the sourcing scene for Vietnamese durian. On July 14, 2026, the 2nd Asia Durian Conference held in Ho Chi Minh City drew about 500 people, of whom over 100 companies were buyers from China alone. Mainstays of Chinese distribution—fruit specialty chains such as Pagoda, Xianfeng Fruit, JD Fresh, Goodfarmer Group, and Shouheng Group—gathered in one place and brought their plans for sourcing Vietnamese durian. What was repeated at the conference was the line "from competition on volume and price to competition on quality, standards, and brand." For Japanese food buyers, this shift is not a story on the far shore. As the giant buyer that is China raises the quality of Vietnamese fruit, Japan's sourcing conditions will quietly be rewritten too.
What was discussed at a conference that gathered 500 people and over 100 Chinese companies
The conference was co-hosted by the Ho Chi Minh City branch of the chamber of commerce and industry, the B2B platform iFresh Asia Fruit, and the export company Dakago. Business talks and discussions continued from July 14 to 15, and a field tour of production areas was arranged for the 16th. What stands out in the breakdown of the roughly 500 participants is the depth of the Chinese side. The fact that over 100 Chinese companies made the trip shows that Vietnamese durian has been upgraded from a mere "cheap supply source" to a strategic commodity that Chinese retailers want to lock in over the long term.
Pagoda is a fruit specialty chain with several thousand stores across China, and JD Fresh is the fresh-produce arm of JD.com; both have sales channels within China that market on quality. What such buyers seek is not "just large volumes at low prices" but "quality that can sit on the shelf and preserve their own brand's trust." Behind the conference's talk of a shift to quality, standards, and brand lies this structural change on the buyer side.
Vietnamese durian's current standing in numbers
In the first five months of 2026, Vietnam's durian exports showed a clear recovery. Organizing the figures that could be verified makes the phase Vietnamese durian is now in clear.
| Item | January–May 2026 export value | Year on year |
|---|---|---|
| Total durian exports | US$562.4 million | +45.2% |
| Of which fresh fruit | US$483.1 million | — |
| Of which frozen | US$77.9 million | +60.3% |
| Of which processed goods | US$1.4 million | +16.7% |
| Exports to China | US$492 million | +76.7% |
Converted at about 150 yen per dollar, total exports come to roughly 84.3 billion yen, and exports to China alone to about 73.8 billion yen. Noteworthy is the concentration—China accounting for 87.5% of the total—and the fact that its growth rate, at +76.7%, greatly exceeded the growth of the total (+45.2%). In other words, the growth of Vietnamese durian is now being led by a single market, China. Furthermore, frozen grew at +60.3%, a pace exceeding fresh fruit, and one can read that the region is shifting from a fresh-fruit-only approach that carries freshness risk toward a multifaceted supply that includes processing and freezing. On this shift to processing, see Vietnamese durian's structural change: fresh fruit plunges while frozen grows touches on this in detail.
The China-dependence gamble created by the shift from "volume" to "quality"
The conference's keyword, "from volume and price to quality, standards, and brand," is a positive evolution for the region and, at the same time, a gamble. The more Chinese major retailers raise quality standards, the more the regions and farmers that meet those standards become optimized for trade with China. Investments such as obtaining region codes, traceability, and standard unification are made first with an eye on the Chinese market, the largest buyer.
In fact, in Vietnamese durian, the move to bring region codes down to the farmer level and advance standardization that can withstand long-term export is accelerating. This move Can Tho's effort to draw a blueprint for long-term export with region codes is also reflected in this. The more a system for competing on quality is put in place, the more the fruit becomes "durian made to fit China's shelves." It means that dependence on China deepens not only in quantity but also in terms of quality standards.
For Japanese sourcing managers, is this shift a tailwind or a headwind?
This becomes the most important point for Japanese buyers. To state the conclusion first, this quality shift can be a headwind in the short term and a tailwind in the medium to long term.
The headwind aspect is clear. The more Chinese majors lock up high-quality lots in long-term contracts, the harder it becomes for Japan's small-lot buyers to secure durian of equivalent quality. On price too, because the movements of the Chinese market, which accounts for 87.5%, set the market itself, the Japanese side has no choice but to negotiate on the premise of "the price China pays." Standing on the same ground as China in fresh-fruit durian carries large disadvantages in both quantity and speed.
On the other hand, there is a tailwind too. If the region invests in quality, standards, and traceability, the benefits are not confined to China alone. Farmers with region codes and QR-based history management in place become better able to respond to Japan's strict residue standards and region verification. Vietnam beginning to operate a nationwide traceability system greatly reduces the Japanese side's burden of region verification. On this point, see Vietnam's national system that tracks durian by QR, as organized there. Japan using the quality infrastructure China has raised—not as fresh fruit but in a different form—there lies a realistic path to winning.
The option of not competing in fresh fruit
For Japanese sourcing to compete head-on with China in fresh fruit is a poor bet. If so, what Japan should target in Vietnamese durian is the processing and freezing domain. That frozen durian exports grew +60.3%, and that the processed-goods market is still small at US$1.4 million with large room to grow, is suggestive for Japanese buyers. With commercial materials such as puree, paste, and frozen flesh, you can stably source raw material for confectionery, baking, ice cream, and drinks while avoiding the speed race over freshness. If Chinese majors lock up the top-grade fresh fruit, Japan can simply access Vietnamese durian through a different entrance—processing raw material.
This way of thinking works all the more in a phase where oversupply drives the region to rock-bottom prices. Rather than buying fresh fruit when the market falls, signing an annual contract with a processing or freezing supplier makes you less exposed to price fluctuations. On durian's market fluctuations themselves, How to read the sourcing of Vietnamese durian that rebounded from the bottom is also a useful reference.
Summary: how Japan rides the wave of quality that China is creating
What the 2nd Asia Durian Conference showed was the reality that Vietnamese durian is changing its standing from a "cheap supply source" to "a commodity chosen for quality." The scale of about 500 people and over 100 Chinese companies, and the figure of +76.7% in exports to China, tell of Chinese buyers leading this shift.
There are three practical next moves for Japanese buyers. First, do not price-compete with China in fresh fruit; shift the pivot to processing and freezing raw material. Second, identify now the regions and export companies with region codes and traceability in place, and build relationships. Third, to avoid being tossed about by the Chinese market, design annual-basis contracts and diversification across multiple regions. The wave of quality China is raising cannot be stopped. If so, it is Japan's turn to assemble a sourcing template of its own on top of that wave.
