{"id":1558,"date":"2026-09-25T12:27:29","date_gmt":"2026-09-25T03:27:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vietnam-agri.com\/industry_news\/nghean-seawater-shrimp\/"},"modified":"2026-09-25T12:27:29","modified_gmt":"2026-09-25T03:27:29","slug":"nghean-seawater-shrimp","status":"publish","type":"industry_news","link":"https:\/\/vietnam-agri.com\/en\/industry_news\/nghean-seawater-shrimp\/","title":{"rendered":"Abandoning a dirty river to pipe seawater 5 km: Nghe An's 55 hectares of shrimp remain on uncertain land contracts"},"content":{"rendered":"

In Quynh Anh, Nghe An Province in north-central Vietnam, a shrimp farmer who laid about 5 km of a seawater pipeline at his own expense 15 years ago has been featured. He is Hoang Xuan Tin, representative of the Loc Thuy Aquaculture Cooperative (HTX Nuoi trong thuy san Loc Thuy). The report is by the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment-affiliated daily Bao Nong nghiep va Moi truong (dated September 23, 2026). The article is not only a success story. A story of a production area where the river water became unusable remade the water source itself<\/strong> and a story of the cooperative's 55-ha lease now being legally in limbo sit side by side. For Japanese buyers, it is material for lining up on the same questionnaire who manages the water intake and how many years the land can be leased.<\/p>\n

When the Mai Giang River became unusable 15 years ago, how did the pond water change<\/h2>\n

The water source was broken by industrial and domestic wastewater<\/h3>\n

The trigger was pollution of the Mai Giang River (song Mai Giang) water system, from which water was drawn. The original explains that pollution worsened with industrial waste and domestic wastewater, conditions arose for disease to appear in shrimp ponds, and many farmers were driven into \"trang tay\" (a state of being left with nothing). The crisis of the production area was not typhoons or market prices but the upstream water.<\/p>\n

Even within the same Nghe An Province, the direction of the response differs. The case of the Nghe An shrimp farm that suffered typhoon damage and rebuilt its ponds for about 2 billion dong<\/a> In that case, investment went toward deepening the water from 1.2 m to 1.6 m to stabilize water temperature and quality. Loc Thuy's choice was not inside the pond but outside it: running about 5 km of pipe to draw water directly from the sea. Even in the same water-quality measure, the place where the hand is applied differs.<\/p>\n

One person laid the pipe, and the farmers around followed<\/h3>\n

On the investment amount, the original only writes \"hang ty dong\" (on the order of billions of dong), without a specific figure. Tin himself states that the initial investment was large and he hesitated. What matters is what came after: the original continues \"ve sau nhieu ho cung manh dan lam theo,\" that later many farmers also boldly did the same thing. In the order where an individual's equipment became the regional standard, there was no system or subsidy coming first. Shrimp farming in this area began before 1990, and after the administrative mergers about 80 ha are concentrated in Quynh Anh.<\/p>\n

The electricity and contracts a cooperative of over 50 ha has built up since 2011<\/h2>\n

A one-year contract became a 10-year contract, and 28 households grew to over 40<\/h3>\n

With the cooperative's establishment in 2011, the first thing to change was the form of the contract. The land lease contract, which each household signed individually on a one-year basis, became valid for 10 years by going through the cooperative. As the benefit became visible, membership increased, and the members, initially 28 households, now number over 40. The original also has a passage noting the target of technical guidance as \"about 50 people,\" and the coexistence of household count and head count is something to confirm when pinning down supply volume.<\/p>\n

They jointly funded six substations at 1 billion dong each<\/h3>\n

According to Tin, this area was wasteland before, with no substations before 2011, operating on generators. The cooperative called on each household to invest, and built six substations at an average of 1 billion dong (1 ty dong) each. When VietGAP was introduced in 2014, additional equipment upgrades were also needed. The original clearly states that the contracting company lacked the means to invest in farming-site infrastructure and basically only put out the contracts. The electricity and water of the production area stand on far more of the farmers' own burden than buyers imagine.<\/p>\n

Three actions that emerged in the production area<\/h3>\n

The reception shows in actions, not statements. The farmers around followed Tin's seawater pipe and installed the same equipment; as the benefit of the 10-year contract became visible, cooperative members grew from 28 households to over 40; and Tin, on behalf of the cooperative, submitted a petition (to trinh) to the administrative body seeking a direct lease of 55 ha. On the third, the administration's decision is not written in the article.<\/p>\n

1 billion dong per ha: what is inside a closed-recirculation pond<\/h2>\n

We line up the original's figures and the yen conversion<\/h3>\n

The Vietnamese \"ty\" is 1 billion. We line up the original's figures, with yen converted at the value updated by exchangerate-api.com on September 25, 2026 (1 yen = 163.60 dong).<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Item<\/th>\nOriginal notation<\/th>\nVND<\/th>\nYen conversion<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Substation (average per unit)<\/td>\n1 t\u1ef7 \u0111\u1ed3ng\/tr\u1ea1m<\/td>\n1 billion dong<\/td>\nAbout 6.11 million yen<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Total for six substations<\/td>\n6 tr\u1ea1m<\/td>\nAbout 6 billion dong<\/td>\nAbout 36.67 million yen<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Investment per ha<\/td>\nkho\u1ea3ng 1 t\u1ef7 \u0111\u1ed3ng\/ha<\/td>\n1 billion dong<\/td>\nAbout 6.11 million yen<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Cumulative investment across the whole production area<\/td>\n50 – 60 t\u1ef7 \u0111\u1ed3ng<\/td>\n50-60 billion dong<\/td>\nAbout 306-367 million yen<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Investment by Tin's household<\/td>\ntr\u00ean ch\u1ee5c t\u1ef7 \u0111\u1ed3ng<\/td>\nOver 10 billion dong<\/td>\nOver about 61.12 million yen<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The total equipment cost of 50-60 ha stays in the 300-million-yen range in yen<\/h3>\n

This is where it diverges most from the Japanese side's sense. The total equipment investment built up over 15 years or more on a 50-60 ha shrimp production area stays, in yen, only in the 300-million-yen range. The digits do not match a story of newly building land-based farming equipment of the same scale in Japan. Turned around, the production area's equipment is of a thinness that becomes obsolete all at once if upgrades fall behind<\/strong>. If you are told it is a sophisticated production area, asking what was added and at what cost over the past five years gets closer to the reality.<\/p>\n

A drum filter mechanically removes feces and leftover feed<\/h3>\n

What Tin's household works on is a water-reuse, closed-recirculation method for whiteleg shrimp (tom the chan trang). The original explains that reusing the recirculated water stabilizes the water environment, keeps the NH3 (ammonia) concentration within an acceptable range, and is effective for long-term, high-density rearing. When water from the pond bottom passes through a drum filter (may tach phan \/ drumfilter), the principle of mechanically catching particles leaves the shrimp's feces, leftover feed, and carcasses on the membrane. Sludge washed off with a high-pressure pump goes to biogas treatment, and the water proceeds to the next filtration stage. In this case the State (Nha nuoc) supported the recirculating filtration system, the closed-recirculation technology, the seed stock, and key materials. Public support enters the technology, while the land rights relationship remains unresolved.<\/p>\n

Where should Japanese buyers check on the water source and the leased land<\/h2>\n

Whether the intake is river or seawater changes the premise of disease risk<\/h3>\n

Production-area audit checklists tend to lean toward feed, chemicals, and traceability. The Loc Thuy example shows that upstream of those lies a layer of water-source ownership and management. A production area with river intake can have its conditions change overnight depending on wastewater from upstream factories or settlements. A production area drawing seawater directly bears the pipe's maintenance cost and power-outage risk itself, but in return is one step removed from external factors. It is not a matter of superior or inferior, but who bears the responsibility for managing that water<\/strong> and whether you can confirm it in writing is the dividing line. Where is the intake, who owns the pipe and substation equipment, how many accidents stopped the intake over the past five years.<\/p>\n

Without asking the remaining years of the lease, the talk of capital investment does not add up<\/h3>\n

Where the original steps in furthest is the land. Each household originally held a contract with the Trinh Mon state farm. That farm became Trinh Mon Aquaculture Joint Stock Company through equitization, and as a result of its full review handing part over to State management, the re-signing of the conventional contract became impossible. Over these few years a state has continued in which there is no legal binding relationship between the two sides, which the original expresses as \"risk always lying in wait.\" To operate sustainably, the whole farming site must be made \"100% clean,\" and the procedure is to decide the titleholder by open bidding. The biggest difficulty is said to be settling the above-ground assets the farmers have built up.<\/p>\n

The course of events in which the Bac Lieu high-tech shrimp farming zone sat idle for nine years and then accepted seven proposals<\/a> overlaid on this, the structure becomes visible. There, the lot layout did not meet the approval requirements and the handover was delayed, so investors left; here, assets sit on the land and it cannot be settled. Both are stopped not by production technology but by paperwork.<\/p>\n

Cooperative-unit certification presupposes commonality of the water source<\/h3>\n

Loc Thuy introduced VietGAP in 2014 and manages over 50 ha under one cooperative. The foundation for taking international certification on a cooperative basis is there. But what differs decisively from the case where the Ca Mau cooperative obtained the ASC Farm Standard<\/a> is whether the land title is fixed. Certification demands the identification of the lot and the managing entity. If the audit begins while the lease contract is in limbo, it stops there.<\/p>\n

Will Nghe An's 80 ha make it onto Japan's sourcing map<\/h2>\n

The water condition leads; the paperwork condition lags<\/h3>\n

Vietnam's shrimp exports were US$3.3 billion in January-August 2026, up 12% year on year (VASEP). The reading is that the competitive axis is shifting from volume to efficiency and added value. In this current, the relative value of production areas that can stably secure water and keep records rises. Loc Thuy leads on the water condition and lags on the paperwork condition. 80 ha is too small to fill a major buyer's annual sourcing on its own, and it is realistic to view it as one block that adds a north-central option to Mekong-Delta-heavy sourcing.<\/p>\n

Figures to grasp before making contact<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Item<\/th>\nDetails<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Location<\/td>\nQuynh Anh, Nghe An Province. Formed June 16, 2025 by merging five former communes<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Operating entity<\/td>\nLoc Thuy Aquaculture Cooperative (established 2011) \/ representative Tin<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Farming area<\/td>\nAbout 80 ha in total, over 50 ha under cooperative management, lease application for 55 ha<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Members<\/td>\nInitially 28 households, now over 40 (the original also notes \"about 50 people\")<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Water intake<\/td>\nDirect intake via about 5 km of pipeline from the sea<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Item and method<\/td>\nWhiteleg shrimp, closed-recirculation method, drum filter plus biogas<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Certification<\/td>\nVietGAP (introduced 2014). No international certification noted<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Land<\/td>\nRe-signing of the contract impossible. Open bidding and settlement of above-ground assets are the challenges<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The next action the buyer can take narrows to one: ask the Nghe An fisheries authority or the cooperative about the processing status of the 55-ha direct-lease application. If it is moving, the lot and the managing entity are fixed, and you can start the talk of certification audit and sample transactions. If it is stopped, there is no contractual foundation even if the water condition is good. You want to confirm this before setting a schedule for a production-area visit.<\/p>\n

Sources referenced<\/h2>\n