{"id":1504,"date":"2026-08-25T19:43:03","date_gmt":"2026-08-25T10:43:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vietnam-agri.com\/?post_type=industry_news&p=1504"},"modified":"2026-08-25T19:43:03","modified_gmt":"2026-08-25T10:43:03","slug":"tuna-us-tariff","status":"publish","type":"industry_news","link":"https:\/\/vietnam-agri.com\/en\/industry_news\/tuna-us-tariff\/","title":{"rendered":"Vietnamese tuna hits US$544 million in seven months, led by the US, but a 12.5% tariff is a year-end headwind"},"content":{"rendered":"

In data the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP) released on 19 August, tuna exports for January to July 2026 reached US$544 million (about 80.5 billion yen at 148 yen to the dollar), turning to a 2% increase year on year. Most of the first half had been below the prior year, but June and July surged two months in a row to push it back. The content of the recovery, however, is skewed to a specific market, and the Section 301 additional tariff of the US Trade Act that took effect on 23 July becomes a burden toward year-end. For Japanese seafood buyers handling Vietnamese tuna, it is material to confirm the concentration risk of the sourcing origin and how to read the price.<\/p>\n

Consecutive increases in June and July filled back the first-half slump<\/h2>\n

According to VASEP, July-alone tuna exports were about US$90 million (about 13.3 billion yen), up 30% from the previous month. The flow of continuing below the prior year from the start of the year through May was overturned in the two months of early summer. In absolute value, US$544 million is still a part of seafood as a whole, but the direction changing from downward to upward is the turning point this time. Buyers who had squeezed their buying during the phase of continued year-on-year declines resumed ordering from June on, when unit price and volume began to return, and that accumulation shows in July's growth.<\/p>\n

What pulled the recovery is the US-bound trade. July US-bound tuna exports were US$37.6 million (about 5.6 billion yen), up more than 80% from the same month last year, and the January-to-July cumulative stacked up to US$213.6 million (about 31.6 billion yen, up 6.3%). As a result, the US accounts for 39.3% of Vietnamese tuna exports, carrying on its own nearly 40% of the whole. Flipped around, if the tariff environment changes while this near-single-leg composition remains, the overall figure sways with it directly. Because supply has concentrated on items with large US consumption, such as canned tuna and loin, it also carries the weakness of being hard to find a substitute market quickly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Indicator<\/th>\nJanuary-July 2026<\/th>\nYear on year<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Total tuna export value<\/td>\nUS$544 million (about 80.5 billion yen)<\/td>\n+2%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Of which US-bound cumulative<\/td>\nUS$213.6 million (about 31.6 billion yen)<\/td>\n+6.3%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
US share<\/td>\n39.3%<\/td>\n\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
July alone, total<\/td>\nAbout US$90 million (about 13.3 billion yen)<\/td>\n+30% (vs. previous month)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
July alone, US-bound<\/td>\nUS$37.6 million (about 5.6 billion yen)<\/td>\n+more than 80%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Amounts are from VASEP's announcement (19 August 2026). Yen conversions are rough estimates calculated at US$1 = 148 yen.<\/small><\/p>\n

With the Section 301 additional tariff that took effect on 23 July, Vietnam alone faces 12.5%<\/h2>\n

Based on an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act concerning forced labor, the US imposed a 12.5% additional tariff on many Vietnamese items from 23 July. The problem is that this level is higher than neighboring competitor countries'. Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico and India stay at 10%, and Vietnam alone is placed 2.5 points at a disadvantage. The more a product is a general grade that competes on price, such as canned tuna and standard frozen goods, the more this gap works. For a US importer, since the landed price changes depending on whether the same-spec raw material is drawn from Vietnam or from Ecuador, it can become a reason to switch sourcing origins.<\/p>\n

In a structure where the US accounts for 40% of the whole, a tariff higher than competitors' is placed on that market. The surge through July may include last-minute demand ahead of the tariff taking effect, and if a reaction comes from August on, the plus that was finally regained in the first half could be shaved away again toward year-end. VASEP's positioning of \"new pressure heading toward year-end\" alongside the recovery is based on this read. Moreover, Section 301 is a measure that pokes not only at the tariff rate but at the content of sourcing, namely forced labor, and the weaker a supplier's proof of origin and fishing process, the more easily it falls out of the pool of trading candidates on fronts other than tariffs too.<\/p>\n

The EU continued a deep decline, and the tug-of-war between markets became clear<\/h2>\n

The EU, another major market, continued a deep slump over these seven months. The tug-of-war in which the US grows while the EU sinks keeps overall tuna exports unstable. The more highly processed a product, the heavier each market's regulations and traceability requirements, so it cannot be moved on bargain pricing alone. Vietnamese tuna exports are in a state where the light and dark of each market are bundled together as-is. If the US hits a ceiling with tariffs and the EU does not return, the thin 2% plus finally stacked up over seven months is liable to crumble from the ground up.<\/p>\n

This structure shows that the region side is being pressed into a design that thins dependence on a single market. The flow in which China has risen to become the largest buyer in Vietnamese seafood overall the move in which China overtook the US to become Vietnamese seafood's largest market<\/a> covers this in detail, but in tuna too the same diversification pressure has begun to work. Having repeatedly experienced a specific market swaying on a single policy, exporters move toward spreading buyers over two or three axes.<\/p>\n

Signs of sourcing diversification Japanese seafood buyers should read<\/h2>\n

Japan is a stable buyer for Vietnam, around third overall in seafood, and July seafood exports to Japan exceeded US$144 million, up 3.8% from the prior year (the cumulative total is also up 2.6%). As the US and EU swing in opposite directions, the Japan-bound trade is accumulating steadily, thin though it is. If the US-bound trade hits a ceiling under high tariffs, Vietnamese exporters' motive to thicken their allocation to Asian markets including Japan grows stronger. For the Japanese side sourcing sashimi loin, frozen saku and canned-tuna raw material, it can become a phase where the volume turned to supply and the negotiating room increase. Rather than hurrying to pile up contracts, it is worth watching, on a quarterly basis, whether suppliers that have been running with US priority start emptying shelf space for Japan.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, that the US Section 301 is a tariff originating in forced labor cannot be overlooked in Japanese sourcing either. A supplier whose proof of raw-material origin and fishing is lax will eventually be questioned in Japanese supply-chain audits too. Whether Vietnam is a supplier that can trace its tuna's efforts to switch origin certification from paper to electronic<\/a> becomes a screening criterion ahead of price. If you lean toward a partner weak in proof power just because you can take the volume pushed out by tariffs cheaply, you stumble later on the audit side.<\/p>\n

Practical points the sourcing side wants to confirm<\/h2>\n

Taking the tug-of-war of tariffs and markets into account, the points a Japanese sourcing manager should watch in the short term narrow to the following four. All of them question the supplier's structure itself, ahead of the numbers on a price list.<\/p>\n