{"id":1487,"date":"2026-08-17T20:15:34","date_gmt":"2026-08-17T11:15:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/vietnam-agri.com\/?post_type=industry_news&p=1487"},"modified":"2026-08-17T20:15:34","modified_gmt":"2026-08-17T11:15:34","slug":"china-durian-imports","status":"publish","type":"industry_news","link":"https:\/\/vietnam-agri.com\/en\/industry_news\/china-durian-imports\/","title":{"rendered":"China buys US$846 million of Vietnamese durian in the first half, emerging as its second-largest supplier"},"content":{"rendered":"

In the first half of 2026, Vietnamese durian imported by China reached US$846 million (about 125.2 billion yen, converted at 148 yen per dollar). This accounts for about 18% of China's total durian imports, and Vietnam has established itself as the \"second supplier\" to the Chinese mainland market after Thailand. The figures were reported by VietnamPlus dated August 10, and back-calculating from the ratio puts China's total durian imports at a scale of about US$4.7 billion (about 700 billion yen) over the half year.<\/p>\n

From the sourcing side, this is the key point: China, the world's largest consumption market, is absorbing a considerable volume of Vietnamese product. The growth toward China, with fresh fruit as the main battlefield, is quietly rewriting the premises of the lots and prices other markets can secure. For Japanese importers too, there is no small meaning in grasping the supply-demand tug-of-war happening behind the durian visible at the storefront.<\/p>\n

The US$846 million in H1 and 18% share show the depth of China dependence<\/h2>\n

Vietnam's durian exports are extremely skewed toward China as a destination. The US$846 million China bought in the first half accounts for a prominent weight even within Vietnam's overall durian exports. That the positioning of \"second-ranked import partner\" has taken hold in Chinese statistics reads not as a merely strong half-year but as evidence that the two countries' supply chains have come to mesh structurally.<\/p>\n

This structure holds both ease of earning and the flip side of fragility. Once China's quarantine requirements or the operation of growing-area codes change, the flow of US$846 million thins instantly. The past course of Vietnam rushing to respond by expanding testing labs also appears in the export expansion in the phase when China expanded testing labs to 50<\/a>. The larger the buyer's volume, the more managing the risk of spec deviation becomes the production area's lifeline.<\/p>\n

Thailand's stronghold is unshaken, while Malaysia surges 342%<\/h2>\n

Although Vietnam rose to second place, top-ranked Thailand is not wavering. VietnamPlus reports that Thailand maintains an edge on three points: logistics, quality control and stable supply. Dang Phuc Nguyen, secretary-general of the Vietnam Fruit and Vegetable Association, also cites this supply-network completeness as Thailand's strength.<\/p>\n

Another thing not to overlook is Malaysia's surge. Its exports to China in the first half grew 342% from the previous year, reaching US$30.26 million (about 4.5 billion yen). The amount itself is less than a thirtieth of Vietnam's, but the growth rate stands out. As the lifting of restrictions on frozen and whole fresh fruit advances, third and fourth suppliers will come to chip away at a corner of the Chinese market. Vietnam's 18% is a figure in the thick of competition, rather than rock-solid.<\/p>\n

China's durian imports lined up by supplier<\/h2>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Supplier<\/th>\nExports to China in H1<\/th>\nCharacteristics<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n
Thailand<\/td>\nTop (the original article does not give a specific amount)<\/td>\nMaintains an edge in logistics, quality and stable supply<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Vietnam<\/td>\nUS$846 million (about 125.2 billion yen) \/ share about 18%<\/td>\nSecond place. Supply concentrated toward China<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Malaysia<\/td>\nUS$30.26 million (about 4.5 billion yen) \/ up 342% year on year<\/td>\nThe amount is small but the growth rate stands out<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
China's total imports (reference)<\/td>\nAbout US$4.7 billion (about 700 billion yen)<\/td>\nA rough estimate back-calculated from Vietnam's 18% share<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

Exchange rate roughly estimated at US$1 \u2248 148 yen. The total import figure is an estimate from the share ratio, not a confirmed official statistic.<\/small><\/p>\n

China's buying rewrites the premises of Vietnamese product's price and distribution<\/h2>\n

From a supply-demand standpoint, what to grasp is that oversupply and price decline are advancing at the same time. The original article conveys experts' view that production expansion must be inseparable from meeting importing countries' technical and quarantine requirements. In a phase where planting increases while the unit price falls, where the large buyers head decides the production area's profitability. The fact that China poured in US$846 million in the first half means that the sales channel for Vietnamese product is strongly drawn to the single tap of China.<\/p>\n

A tailwind on the institutional side is also visible. The Vietnamese government, in Resolution No. 36\/2026\/NQ-CP, showed a policy of simplifying the procedures for granting and managing growing-area codes and packing-facility codes. If codes are issued faster, that many more lots can be shipped to China through formal routes. Put the other way, code management can also be an accelerator that strengthens China dependence. In a phase where the supply side's institutions back China exports, buyers in other markets need to build sourcing plans on the premise that Vietnamese product will be locked up by China first.<\/p>\n

This pull works differently for fresh fruit and processed goods. Fresh fruit, under freshness constraints, tends to flow to land and short-distance transport toward China, and the volume going to distant markets is relatively squeezed. Conversely, freezing raises the freedom of storage and transport, allowing the destination to be chosen. That Vietnam is strengthening the move to absorb the plunge in fresh fruit through frozen processing<\/a> is a rational move to disperse the risk of this concentration. As a move to break China dependence from the outside, the move in which India lifted its ban on fresh-fruit imports<\/a> could also become a new recipient.<\/p>\n

The pressure of Chinese demand that affects Japan's frozen-durian sourcing<\/h2>\n

Japan imports durian mainly frozen. China's vigorous buying affects this indirectly. If fresh-fruit demand toward China supports the floor of the production-area price, and the scramble for durian as a processing raw material strengthens, the sourcing cost of pulp going to frozen use is also apt to move. The fact that China bought US$846 million in the first half and established itself as the second supplier with an 18% share reads, for Japanese importers, as a signal that \"upstream supply-demand is tightening.\"<\/p>\n

Going one step further, the fact that China's share rose to 18% also leads to a reading that \"there is still room to grow.\" If Vietnam catches up to top-ranked Thailand on price and supply volume, China will lean even further toward Vietnamese product. At that point, the scramble for fresh fruit intensifies, and the market for pulp going to frozen raw material is apt to rise. When Japanese buyers set an annual budget for frozen durian, it is realistic to factor in which way China's imports from Vietnam move from 18%, as a variable alongside the exchange rate.<\/p>\n

In practice, judging the timing of orders by unit price alone will trip you up. Changes in China's growing-area-code operation and quarantine requirements shake the shipping rhythm of Vietnamese product as a whole. If you handle frozen durian for Japan, it is prudent to disperse contracts across multiple production areas and multiple seasons, building a structure that can absorb price swings. Tracking China's demand trend monthly serves directly as a breakwater for sourcing.<\/p>\n

Key points to grasp in sourcing practice<\/h2>\n